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Abstract
Using a survey on wage expectations among students at two Swiss institutions of higher
education, we examine the wage expectations of our respondents along two main lines.
First, we investigate the rationality of wage expectations by comparing average expected
wages from our sample with those of similar graduates; we further examine how our
respondents revise their expectations when provided information about actual wages.
Second, using causal mediation analysis, we test whether the consideration of a rich set of
personal and professional controls, namely concerning family formation and children in
addition to professional preferences, accounts for the difference in wage expectations across
genders. We find that males and females overestimate their wages compared to actual
ones, and that males respond in an overconfident manner to information about outside
wages. Despite the attenuation of the gender difference in wage expectations brought
about by the comprehensive set of controls, gender generally retains a significant direct,
unexplained effect on wage expectations.
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1 Introduction
Marked differences remain in today’s labor market concerning the professional paths of men
and women. Blau and Kahn (2017), for example, survey the research on the gender wage gap
and find that, despite considerable gender wage convergence during the period 1980-2010,
that process was much less pronounced at the top of the wage distribution. Further, it was
the explained part of the gap that declined, indicating gains in education and experience of
women relative to men, whereas the unexplained part of the gap did not change much.
Given the well-established and well-known gender wage gap, as well as the different paths
that women and men typically follow in the labor market, rational and forward looking men
and women, when asked about wage expectations about their own individual future, would
generate forecasts in line with the actual gender wage gap. The goal of our paper is, on
the one hand, to examine whether this expectational wage gap is rational, in the sense
of matching actual wages from comparable groups in the population, and, further, in the
way that our respondents react to information about actual wages; on the other hand,
we test whether the gender differences in wage forecasts of our respondents are explained
by differences in their professional and personal preferences. Specifically, once we control
for how individuals see themselves looking forward, not only professionally but also along
personal dimensions, we want to know whether or not gender remains as a residual source
of wage expectations.
Averaging the wage expectations from our respondents and contrasting them with aver-
ages of actual wages from similar population groups in the labor market, we find that both
men and women overestimate wages. To gain further insight into the formation of wage
expectations, we perform an experiment to examine how our respondents react to informa-
tion about actual wages. While women do not change their expectations, males react in an
overconfident way to the information provided.
As commonly found in the literature, it is also the case that our male and female respon-
dents report expecting different unconditional wages, with men having higher average wage
expectations than women. Our second contribution to the literature is to examine whether
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this commonly found expectational wage gap vanishes once we control for a broader and
more comprehensive set of controls, including detailed answers on professional and personal
preferences, the latter inclusive of questions on family formation and desired number of chil-
dren. Using inverse probability weighting methods in the context of causal mediation anal-
ysis to estimate the effects of gender on expected wages, we find that the broader set of
covariates attenuates the direct effect of gender on wage expectations. Nonetheless, a sig-
nificant and quantitatively important direct and unexplained effect of gender on wage ex-
pectations generally remains.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature survey on gender
differences in wage expectations. Section 3 introduces our data set. Section 4 outlines
the methodological framework for decomposing the expectational wage gap. Results are
presented in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
In order to simplify the exposition and facilitate the connection with our paper, we divide
our overview of the literature into two strands: one that attempts to gauge the rational-
ity/accuracy of wage expectations, and the other investigating reasons why wage expecta-
tions systematically vary with gender.
Expectations are a potentially very important input in decision making, notably when
choosing schooling and investments in human capital. As a result, some of the attempts
to measure and analyze wage expectations elicited earnings expectations from students and
analyzed the impact of those expectations on the individual choice of educational track
going forward.
Freeman (1971) and Freeman (1975), for example, showed that the expectations of stu-
dents corresponded to a high degree with the performance of earlier cohorts in the labor
market. This was the case both for initial wages under a variety of occupations as well as
to wages after 15 years past and even at the end of the respective professional careers. He
further showed that expected income differences between occupations have an influence on
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the choice of education, assuming a limited set of educational alternatives.
Dominitz and Manski (1996b) asked high school and college undergraduate students
to complete a computerized detailed questionnaire eliciting beliefs about income levels
attained under different schooling levels as well as respondents’ beliefs about current
earnings distributions. They found that that students were capable of making realistic
estimates of future incomes and also that most of them expected to have positive college
returns. Betts (1996) similarly found that student expectations were reasonably aligned
with income realizations despite considerable individual variability linked to personal traits
(such as year and field of study).
Using survey data on weekly earnings and expectations from the American Survey of
Economic Expectations (SEE), Dominitz (1998) found that earnings expectations elicited in
the form of subjective probabilities varied in sensible ways with contemporaneous earnings
realizations and with other individual attributes. Since the SEE follows earnings and earn-
ings expectations over time, it was additionally possible to see how expectations adjusted
to new income realizations. Interestingly, respondents appeared to adjust expectations one
for one when income goes down but less than one for one when they experienced an increase
in income. Das and van Soest (1999) likewise examined expectations revisions over time
using a Dutch panel where information on income expectations for the same household is
available in consecutive years. Comparing expected and realized income changes for the
same time period, they found that, on average, future income growth was significantly un-
derestimated. In particular, people whose income decreased in the recent past tended to be
too pessimistic. Negative transitory incomes were too often considered to be permanent.
A strand of research has also examined whether gender differences in wage expectations
remain even after current salary information is provided. Martin (1989), for example, after
interviewing almost 100 students from Business and Economics Departments at a mid-size
American university, found that even when providing students with information about com-
bined salaries of men and women, women expected to earn less than their male counter-
parts. Here, however, wage information was provided with the survey to all the respon-
dents; therefore, it was not possible to assess how respondents modified their wage expec-
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tations as a response to information).
Our contribution to this strand of the literature is as follows. In line with existing work,
we compare student wage expectations with realized wages for similar groups of graduates.
Further, through an information experiment, we directly analyze how information on average
income for groups in the population alters wage expectations, and how such an adjustment
of expectations varies by gender. Other contributions in the literature (e.g. Dominitz
and Manski (1996a) and Das and van Soest (1999)) examine expectational adjustments
under “real world” circumstances, thus in a situation where researchers cannot see what
has effectively changed in the information set of respondents. Since our dataset contains
information pertaining to a single point in time, it is not suited for the examination of
how expectations vary in response to changes in the students’ own incomes. Nonetheless,
our experiment allows us to answer a more general question of how respondents react to
income information on others. Indeed, the experiment allows us to directly measure the
expectational response to a change in the information set of the respondents that is fully
controlled and held constant up to the new information on wage realizations. We are
not aware of other experimental work aimed at examining the accuracy or rationality of
adjustments in income expectations.
Since Dominitz (1998), various papers have elicited students’ expectations for different
population groups and tried to explain the differences. Some authors explain the
differences in wage expectations and elicit wages due to differences in college and major
choices. To explain how information regarding major-specific earnings might explain
educational choices, Hastings, Neilson, and Zimmerman (2015) evaluated a policy that
provided information about college and major-specific earnings and cost outcomes in
Chile. They found that information disclosure about earning outcomes changes college
choice, but its impact is limited by strong non-pecuniary preferences. Regarding gender
differences, the overall view in the literature is that men and women have different own
wage expectations despite having good information about earnings of their peers (Smith
and Powell (1990)). Despite both men and women overestimating their earnings, women’s
expectations seem to be more realistic when entering the labor market (Heckert, Droste,
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Adams, Griffin, Roberts, Mueller, and Wallis (2002a), Betts (1996)). Furthermore, this
gender gap that closely resembles actual wage differences, prevails across subgroups, and
along the entire wage distribution (Kiessling, Pinger, Seegers, and Bergerhoff (2019)).1
Side by side with the literature testing the rationality and accuracy of wage expectations,
a different strand of work has attempted to provide reasons why expectations vary across
gender. The literature has overwhelmingly confirmed that males expect higher wages than
females (see e.g. Brunello, Lucifora, and Winter-Ebmer (2004)). In their pioneering work,
Major and Konar (1984) found that differences in career paths, pay comparisons standards,
and job features explained 75% of the variance associated to gender differences in pay
expectations. Martin (1989) and McFarlin, Frone, Major, and Konar (1989) found a similar
gender disparity in expected entry-level wages among senior students in business-related
fields. As stated earlier, an expectational wage gap may simply be a reflection of rational
forecasts of an actual wage gap, the latter very well documented as well in the empirical
literature. Nonetheless, and in view of the role expectations take in informing decisions,
establishing the causes of the expectational wage gap by gender remains an important open
question.
Gender differences in wage expectations have not been limited to the American context.
Menon, Pashourtidou, Polycarpou, and Pashardes (2012) provided evidence of gender dif-
ferences in employment and wage expectations in Cyprus. They showed that female stu-
dents have lower earnings expectations than their male counterparts, and that these expec-
tations were realistic even among Cypriot educated women. Using a survey conducted at
a major Italian university, Filipin and Ichino (2005) show that expected wages are consis-
tent with realized gender wage gaps at the entry level, but students underestimate the wage
gap along the career. Moreover, they found that females always expect a higher wage gap
than males, and a larger fraction of females attributes the causes of this gap to employ-
ers’ discriminatory preferences. In a recent study using a sample of over 15,000 German
students, Kiessling, Pinger, Seegers, and Bergerhoff (2019) documented a large gender gap
in wage expectations that resembles actual wage differences. Moreover, this gap in wage
1Bonnard and Giret (2016) find that women appear to have less accurate wage expectations concerning
the long term.
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expectations remains across population subgroups and along the wage distribution. While
gender differences in wage expectations are present at the start of people’s career, they in-
crease over the prospective life cycle. Hogue, DuBois, and Fox-Cardamone (2010) argue
that salary expectations start even before an individual begins to work. Using a sample of
about 500 undergrad students in the US, they show that women expected to be paid less
than men at the beginning and it increases at the peak of their careers.
While these gender differences in wage expectations have been documented extensively
in the literature, the key question is indeed how gender differences in wage expectations
are explained. Multiple studies provide different answers. We discuss next five of the main
causes that might drive gender differences in wage expectations, and determine how family
and career expectations contribute to explain this gap.
First, individual characteristics as well as job preferences may lead men and women to
chose different jobs and make different career decisions. For example, in Hogue, DuBois, and
Fox-Cardamone (2010), men and women are conscious of the pay implications that choosing
a female- or a male-dominated job will imply. They show that job intentions (partially)
account for the gender differences in pay expectations. Individuals who intended to hold
female-dominated jobs expected to be paid less than those pursuing male-dominated jobs.
Along similar lines, Gasser, Flint, and Tan (2000) found that men have higher promotion
expectations for male- and neutral-oriented jobs than their female counterparts. Existing
studies have not been limited to female-male job classifications, however. Osikominu and
Pfeifer (2018) confirm that women have consistent lower wage expectations than men across
different education programs such as STEM and non-STEM fields. Nonetheless, they found
that differences in wage expectations were not explained by the probability of choosing a
STEM major.
Second, psychological features such as self-perceptions, self-esteem and self-efficacy have
also been examined. The psychological literature, in particular, is very rich regarding self-
related theories and has shown that wage expectations and self-views are correlated with
job attributes and pay expectations (Hogue, DuBois, and Fox-Cardamone (2010)). These
authors attribute lower female self-wage expectations to the fact that women see themselves
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performing a female-dominated job, or to their belief that they are less competent at work
than men. They also suggest that women believe holding a male-dominated job creates a pay
advantage, and in reality, holding a male-dominated job boosts women’s pay. Contrasting
with these findings, Zhang and Zheng (2019) found that gender differences in self-views
favors females in China. They attribute this evidence to their sample – in which most
women hold a career track position and have longer average years of education than the
national average in China.
A third explanation for gender differences in wage expectations is rooted in gender
differences in attitudes towards preference for competition and negotiation skills. Using
a sample of about 1500 Swiss lower-secondary school students, Buser and Wolter (2017)
found that, at all levels of the ability distribution, willingness to compete is associated with
choosing more challenging options which, in turn, leads to higher-paid careers. Kleinjans
(2009) pointed out that female’s distaste for competition decreases educational achievement
and partially explains the gender segregation in occupational fields, particularly in Law,
Business & Management, and Health and Education. Using tournament data, Niederle and
Vesterlind (2007) showed that women dislike competition and that men are substantially
more overconfident than women. This behavior towards competition may carry over to
other fields and situations, for example to salary negotiations and negotiation skills and
strategies. Barron (2003) showed that differences across male and female’s salary requests
and in salary negotiation behavior are explained by beliefs about self, entitlement, other
opportunities, and one’s value in the workplace.
A fourth explanation concerns gender differences in attitudes related to work as well
as family values and aspirations. Individuals might be already aware at an early age of
their career and family plans, and therefore internalize those in their future decisions in the
labor market. As a result, perhaps expecting to work fewer hours or taking jobs that help
reconcile family and work (Goldin (2014)), women may have lower salary expectations, and
lower wages compared to men (Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens (2017)). Chevalier (2007)
documented that child rearing and career break expectations accounted for about 10% of
the gender wage gap in the UK. For these authors, because women have child rearing
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preferences and expect to take a career break, they reduce their search and expect a lower
wage. As consequence, they are more likely to be employed in a poorer job, less willing to
move across jobs, and more likely to obtain a lower wage. Heckert, Droste, Adams, Griffin,
Roberts, Mueller, and Wallis (2002b) also pointed out that wage expectations are affected by
time preferences for childrearing but also for conciliating weekly hours worked with family
responsibilities. Using very detailed information on career plans and earning expectations
of college business school seniors, Blau and Ferber (1991) provide evidence women expect
to work fewer years than men. However, gender differences in expected earnings have any
effect on the number of years that women expect to work in the labor market. In our paper,
we paid particular attention to these factors and investigate how much family and career
aspirations explain of the gender differences in wage expectations.
A fifth explanation examines factors such as career referents, stereotypes, social
comparisons, and perceived discrimination or perceptions about pay standards. Gibson
and Lawrence (2010) found that women have lower expectations than men even when
they identified high-level referents and even when those referents are women. Related
to this, McFarlin, Frone, Major, and Konar (1989) show evidence that same-sex
comparisons are a stronger predictor of career-entry pay expectations than opposite-sex
comparisons. Jackson, Gardner, and Sullivan (1992) found that fair pay standards was
the main predictor for explaining differences in wage expectations. Orazem, Werbel,
and McElroy (2003) show that lower reservation wages for women are explained because
women perceived lower employment opportunities than men which are due to perceived
discrimination in the work force. According to these authors, the adverse effects of
perceived discrimination might be minimized as women gather more information about
labor market prospects, so they can increase their reservation wages and actual wages. In
this line, also a recent laboratory experiment of Bordalo, Coffman, Gennaioli, and Shleifer
(2019) showed that stereotypes affect self-beliefs and own performance. It is therefore
important to know whether individuals have accurate wage perceptions.
Our contribution to this strand of the literature is as follows. First, we provide a com-
prehensive overview and compare the role of career and family aspirations in determining
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wage expectations. As detailed before, previous studies have pointed out the importance of
these factors when studying their role individually but were not able to disentangle their
individual contributions once jointly considered. Second, we compare differences in expec-
tations with real wage differences, even when information is provided. In our new survey
among students of two Swiss institutions of higher education, we cover not only professional
aspirations and preferences but also personal ones. We included detailed questions about
the respondent’s intent in forming a family, number of children s/he would like to have,
degree of labor market attachment in the presence of children, among others, which allow
us to determine exactly the importance of these covariates for eliciting wage expectations.
More precisely, we contribute directly to the literature addressing in the fourth explanation
above although we are also part of the contributions that focus on individual characteristics
and job preferences, the first explanation. Further, to provide more sophisticated empirical
methods than those conventionally used in decomposing the (expectational) gender wage
gap. Specifically, by resorting to casual mediation analysis, we are better able to address
endogeneity issues as well as to allow for nonlinear relations between our covariates and con-
founders and wage expectations.
3 Data
Our data was collected by running a detailed survey among undergraduate students in two
Swiss institutions of higher education, namely the Business School of the Bern University of
Applied Sciences (BUAS), and the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the Univer-
sity of Fribourg. The answers were collected on paper. Individual classes were visited and
the survey was presented to students for immediate completion and collection. Data collec-
tion took place mostly during the first week of the Spring semester of 2017 in order to max-
imize the response rate. All undergraduate classes of the Business Administration (BBA)
and Business and IT (BWI) degrees were visited at BUAS; at the University of Fribourg,
respondents attended one of two large introductory statistics classes in the Economics pro-
gram. Respondents in Fribourg were enrolled in three different degree programs: Bachelor
in Economics (VWL), Business Administration (BBA) and Communications (KOMM).
9
The questionnaires comprised three groups of questions. Students were first asked about
general information, such as age, gender, nationality, degree chosen and whether they were
enrolled in a part- or full-time program. This was followed by two separate blocks of
questions about professional and personal matters. The professional section asked students
about their preferences regarding a variety of job attributes, whether they intended to work
part- or full-time upon completion of their degree, industry and occupation where they
expect to be working, expected wage upon completion of the degree and three years after
graduation, if they would rather hold a management or a consulting/supporting position.
The personal section inquired about the intent of forming a family, number of desired
children and associated intended degree of labor market participation in the presence of
children, the labor market attachment of both parents during different stages of childhood
(daycare, Kindergarten and primary school ages of the respondent), type of residence, family
composition, and educational attainment of both parents, among other questions. In total,
our sample comprises 865 observations from both educational institutions combined.
While all questionnaires had these three groups of questions, the order in which pro-
fessional and personal questions appeared was randomized. In the control version of the
questionnaire, general questions were followed by professional questions, with the personal
block appearing at the end. In another version of the questionnaire, the second group of
questions was about personal matters and the professional block only showed at the end.
We labeled this version as “the different order” version. A third version of the questionnaire
retained the question order of the control version but introduced a bar graph with infor-
mation on monthly gross income in the private sector, according to age and gender. This
is the “information” version of the survey. It is important to see that this information was
not necessarily helpful for forming expectations about the own wage directly upon finishing
university of three years thereafter. This because it neither focused on university graduates
nor on years in the labor market. The information version of questionnaire can be found in
Appendix A.2
2As indicated above, the control version was obtained by eliminating the bar graph from page 1.
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4 Methodological framework
The decomposition of wage gaps across gender aims at disentangling the total gap into
an explained component that can be attributed to differences in observed labor market
relevant characteristics and an unexplained remainder. In addition to the classical linear
decomposition of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), non-parametric decomposition methods
have for instance been proposed by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), Barsky, Bound,
Charles, and Lupton (2002), Fro¨lich (2007), Mora (2008), and N˜opo (2008), as well as
methods for decompositions at quantiles rather than means, see Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce
(1993), DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), Machado and Mata (2005), Melly (2005),
Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2007), Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Melly (2009), and
Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009). However, such progress in estimation methods stands in
contrast to the widespread ignorance of identification issues, in particular the endogeneity of
observed characteristics, as for instance pointed out in Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011).
Following Huber (2015) and Huber and Solovyeva (2018), we formulate the
decomposition in the context of a causal model for mediation analysis which allows
explicating endogeneity issues. Mediation analysis, as for instance discussed in Baron
and Kenny (1986), aims at disentangling the causal mechanisms through which an
explanatory variable affects an outcome, with mediators being intermediate outcomes
lying on the causal pathway between the explanatory variable and the outcome. Applied
to decompositions, gender is the explanatory variable at the beginning of any individual’s
causal chain affecting expectational wage, because it is determined at or prior to birth.
Choice of study program, career preferences, and family plans, on the other hand,
are mediators (often referred to as observed characteristics in the wage decomposition
literature), because they occur later in life and are thus potentially influenced by gender,
while the mediators themselves likely affect wage expectations. Given this causal structure,
the explained component in the decomposition literature corresponds to the indirect
effect of gender on wage expectations that operates through these mediators. Conversely,
the unexplained component equals the direct effect of gender on wage expectations that
operates through unobserved mediators like unmeasured personality traits.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the decomposition
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More formally, let G denote a binary dummy for gender, Y the wage expectations out-
come and X a vector of observed mediators. G may affect Y indirectly via its effect on X,
i.e. by a causal mechanism related to observed characteristics. For instance, gender might
have an effect on expected wages because females and males target different job types. G
might influence Y also directly, i.e. through factors not observed in X. A graphical rep-
resentation of this causal framework is given in Figure 1, with arrows representing causal
effects: G influences Y either through X or directly. For defining the effects of interest, we
denote by Y (g) and X(g) the potential outcomes and mediators when exogenously setting
gender G to value g, with g ∈ {1, 0}.3 Then, E(X(1))− E(X(0)) gives the average causal
effect of G on mediators X, while E(Y (1)) − E(Y (0)), corresponds to the (total) average
causal effect of G on Y , represented by the sum of direct and indirect (i.e. operating through
X) effects.
As in Robins and Greenland (1992) and Pearl (2001) (among many others), we further
refine the potential outcome notation to adapt it to the mediation framework: Let Y (g) =
Y (g,X(g)), which explicates that the potential outcome is influenced by the group variable
both directly and indirectly via X(g). We can thus express the total effect of G on Y as
E(Y (1))−E(Y (0)) = E[Y (1, X(1))]−E[Y (0, X(0))] in order to decompose the latter into
direct and indirect effects. That is, the difference in potential outcomes due to altering X(1)
to X(0) while keeping gender fixed at G = 1 yields the indirect effect (denoted by ψ), while
modifying gender G and keeping the characteristics constant at X(0) yields the direct effect
3See for instance Rubin (1974) for an introduction to the potential outcome framework.
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(η). Summing both up gives the total causal effect, as formally expressed below:
E[Y (1, X(1))]− E[Y (0, X(0))] = E[Y (1, X(1))]− E[Y (1, X(0))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ
+E[Y (1, X(0))]− E[Y (0, X(0))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
η
(1)
Depending on whether (the wage expectations of) males or females are considered as ref-
erence group with G = 1, the magnitudes of ψ and η may differ due to interaction effects
between G and X, i.e. effect heterogeneities in gender. In the application provided in Sec-
tion 5, we present the results when considering both females and males as reference group.
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition consistently estimates the indirect and direct effects
as the explained and unexplained components, respectively, when both G and X are exoge-
nous. This rules out confounding of the gender-outcome, gender-mediators, or mediators-
outcome relationship. In addition, the decomposition requires the wage expectations to be
linear in the mediators is also required. Assumption 1 formalizes these restrictions.
Assumption 1 (sequential independence):
(a) {Y (g′, x), X(g)}⊥G for all g′, g ∈ {0, 1} and x in the support of X,
(b) Y (g′, x)⊥X|G = g for all g′, g ∈ {0, 1} and x in the support of X,
(c) Y (g,X) is linear X for g ∈ {0, 1},
where ‘⊥’ denotes statistical independence. Under Assumption 1(a), G quasi-random, i.e.
there are no variables affecting both G on the one hand and Y and/or X on the other hand.
Under Assumption 1(b), observed characteristics like education quasi-random within gen-
der, i.e. given G, so that there are no affecting both X and Y .4 Assumption 1(c) imposes
potential outcomes to be linear in X.
As also discussed in Huber and Solovyeva (2018), under Assumption 1(a), E(X(g)) =
E(X|G = g), while under Assumptions 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c), E[Y (g, x)] = E(Y |G = g,X =
x) = cg +xβg, with cg denoting a gender-specific constant and βg a vector of gender-specific
coefficients on X. By iterated expectations, E[Y (g,X(g′))] = cg + E(X|G = g′)βg for g, g′
4Assumptions 1(a) and 1(b) could be relaxed to mean independence when considering average wage gaps,
while full independence is required for decompositions of quantiles.
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∈ {0, 1}. Therefore,
ψ = E[Y (1, X(1))]− E[Y (1, X(0))] = [E(X|G = 1)− E(X|G = 0)]β1, (2)
η = E[Y (1, X(0))]− E[Y (0, X(0))] = c1 − c0 + E(X|G = 0)(β1 − β0). (3)
The probability limits of the explained and unexplained components in the linear Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition correspond to the left hand expressions in (2) and (3), respectively.
In this paper, we also consider a semiparametric propensity score weighting approach for
causal mediation analysis suggested in Huber (2014), that improves on the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition in two dimensions. First, it does not impose linearity of the outcome in the
mediators and second, it allows controlling for observed confounders not influenced by the
treatment, henceforth denoted by W . We therefore control for a range of socio-economic
variables (including age, nationality, number of siblings, parental education and occupation,
material wellbeing) to at least mitigate the endogeneity of gender (which is not necessarily
random in the two institutions considered) and the mediators. Among W we also include the
randomized version of the questionnaire, i.e. indicators for whether the order of professional
and personal questions was reversed or whether a graph with information on median monthly
gross earnings by age and gender were shown. While the questionnaire version is not related
to G due to randomization, it might potentially affects both X and Y .
Formally, out estimation approach is consistent under Assumption 2, which has among
others also been considered in Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto (2010).
Assumption 2 (sequential conditional independence):
(a) {Y (g′, x), X(g)}⊥G|W for all g′, g ∈ {0, 1} and x in the support of X,
(b) Y (g′, x)⊥X|G = g,W = w for all g′, g ∈ {0, 1} and x,w in the support of X,W ,
(c) Pr(G = 1|X = x,W = w) > 0 and 0 < Pr(G = 1|W = w) < 1 for all x,w in the support
of X,W .
Assumptions 2(a) and (b) require that conditional on W , no unobserved confounders either
jointly affect G and Y , G and X, or X and Y given G. We acknowledge that this may not
hold in our empirical application presented further below, given the limited number of ob-
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served control variables. Yet, including control variables likely improves upon conventional
wage decompositions that do not account for any form of confounding. Assumption 2(c) is
a common support condition, requiring that the conditional probability of belonging to the
reference group (G = 1) given X,W is larger than zero, while the conditional probability
given W must neither be zero nor one. The latter restriction means that for each value of
W , there exist both females and males in the population.
Under Assumption 2, it follows from the results on identification of direct and indirect
effects by inverse probability weighting (IPW) in Huber (2014) that
ψ = E
[
Y ·G
Pr(G = 1|W )
]
− E
[
Y ·G
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X,W )
1− Pr(G = 1|W )
]
, (4)
η = E
[
Y ·G
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X,W )
1− Pr(G = 1|W )
]
− E
[
Y · (1−G)
1− Pr(G = 1|W )
]
. (5)
In our application, we estimate Pr(G = 1|X = x,W = w) and Pr(G = 1|W = w) by
probit regressions and ψ and η by normalized sample analogues of 4 and 5, respectively,
implying that the weights of observations within treatment states sum up to one in our
sample. Furthermore, we drop observations with estimated propensity scores below 2% (or
0.02) and above 98% (or 0.98) to prevent that some observations receive too extreme weights
in the estimation of direct and indirect effects.
In addition to the expectational wage gap decomposition by gender, the empirical analy-
sis investigates whether the randomized questionnaire version affects the wage expectations
of females and males differently. The questionnaire version is therefore once regarded as
control variable for mediator-outcome confounding in the decomposition, and once as treat-
ment variable to assess its causal effect on wage expectations.
5 Results
We begin our empirical analysis by comparing average wages in our sample to averages of
realized wages from comparable samples, as follows. The first two rows of Table 1 contain
average wages from the FH-Lohn, a yearly survey of wages of alumni of Swiss Universities
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of Applied Sciences. Survey participation is voluntary and elicited by email, and further
completed in an electronic format. In Table 1 below (3rd and 4th rows), we include the
average of wages reported by alumni in the surveys of 2016 and 2017. For 2016, we only had
data on average wages for all former students that answered the survey, thus comprising
all ages and experience. For 2017, it was possible to confine the search to alumni younger
than 30 years of age, reaching therefore an age range and presumed experience closer to
that of our student respondents. It was further possible to separate the average wages
by gender and degree, and the numbers reported correspond to Business School former
students, specifically to alumni who graduated in Business Administration.
Table 1: Descriptives: Realized Wages and Wage Expectations
Means Sample Years of Obs Male Obs Females % Change
source Experience Males-Females
Realized FH-Lohn (2016) all 26 6116.85 18 5667.54 7.93%
Wages FH-Lohn (2017) less than 30 years old 111 6099.54 100 5776.46 5.59%
Wage Fribourg University 0 497 6858.15 360 6252.43 9.69 %
Expectations & BFH 3 498 8418.42 360 7546.18 11.56 %
(own survey) Only BFH 0 391 6890.35 249 6424.20 7.26 %
3 392 8430.80 249 7564.76 11.45 %
Information Treatment (BFH only)
Exposed to information 0 130 6947.12 75 6291.67 10.42 %
(treated group) 3 129 8551.36 75 7553.33 13.21 %
No exposed to information 0 137 6889.60 79 6465.19 6.56 %
(control group) 3 140 8333.04 80 7518.75 10.83 %
Note: This table uses information from the survey collected by the Association of Universities of Applied
Sciences (FH-Lohn), and our own survey.
Rows 3 through 6 include average wages from our own sample, first from the full sample
of BFH and the University of Fribourg combined, and then for BFH alone. The bottom 4
rows partition the BFH into a subsample from the information treated group (which received
information on outside wages in their questionnaire) and the control subsample (devoid of
outside wage information).
Our sample confirms one stylized fact from the literature, namely the existence of an
expectational gender wage gap (rows 3 through 10, last column). In particular, for our
overall sample, the expectational gender wage gap is 9.7%, concerning expected wages upon
16
graduation, and 11.6%, for expected wages three years thereafter. (Actual wages from FH-
Lohn are also in line with the well-established (raw) gender wage gap as can be seen in
rows 1 and 2, last column.) Expected wages increase over time, with expectations 3 years
ahead of graduation systematically exceeding those for graduation wages (rows 3 through
10, along “Male” and “Female” columns). We cannot really compare the 2016 and 2017
sample averages of FH-Lohn because they relate to two different groups: the 2016 average
wage was an average over all graduates who took the survey whereas the 2017 figure is for
graduates under 30. It is somewhat surprising that the 2016 average wage, excluding more
experienced individuals, amounts to a higher average wage than the 2017 average wage,
pertaining to graduates of all ages and experience. This may simply reflect greater sample
attrition for higher age groups.
For the purpose of comparing realized wages and expectations, the two most similar
groups in Table 1 are 2017 average realized wages from FH-Lohn (younger than 30), and
the BFH student respondents. Table 2 computes the percentage excess of the average wage
expectations from different BFH subsamples relative to the 2017 average wage from FH-
Lohn, the latter from row 2 in the preceeding Table.
Table 2: Deviations from Reality: Percentage differences between Expected and Realized
Wages
Wage differences (we - w)/w, %
Men Women
0 years of experience
Only BFH 12.44 8.24
Exposed to information (treated group) 13.09 8.92
No exposed to information (control group) 12.95 11.92
3 years of experience
Only BFH 38.02 30.64
Exposed to information (treated group) 40.2 30.76
No exposed to information (control group) 36.62 30.16
Note: Uses information from Table 1 to compute percentage differences.
As the numbers in Table 2 indicate (all entries are positive), both men and women over-
estimate their wages relative to those of comparable graduates. Comparing expectations
and actual wages for workers without experience, for example, the average of BFH wage
17
expectations for males in the full sample exceeds by 12.44% actual earnings of similar grad-
uates in 2017. For females, this gap amounts to 8.24%. The gap widens once we consider
wages with three years’ experience. For the whole of BFH, average expected wages exceed
realizations by 38% for males, and by 30.6% for females. Thus, both males and females
are overconfident in that expectations systematically exceed realizations from comparable
groups.
Table 2 also shows how average wage expectations changed for the group that received
outside wage information. For treated males, average expected wages appear to increase,
and this is true for no experience or three years on. For females, the change in average
expected wages is more subtle and there is even a decline for the shorter time horizon. We
next proceed to a rigorous analysis of the causal effects of the questionnaire randomization,
described earlier.
Table 3: Descriptives for experiment
control treatment: information treatment: order
mean mean dif pval mean dif pval missing
female 0.39 0.41 0.02 0.59 0.47 0.08 0.06 1
age 23.06 23.25 0.19 0.35 23.25 0.20 0.34 0
Swiss 0.89 0.86 -0.03 0.23 0.89 0.00 0.85 0
has siblings 0.89 0.92 0.03 0.20 0.95 0.06 0.01 5
mom has higher education 0.24 0.20 -0.04 0.22 0.20 -0.04 0.26 8
dad has higher education 0.39 0.40 0.01 0.80 0.37 -0.02 0.63 13
mum worked full time when I was 4-6 0.15 0.16 0.01 0.75 0.14 -0.01 0.68 7
mum worked part time when I was 4-6 0.44 0.45 0.01 0.80 0.41 -0.03 0.42 7
wellbeing 2.41 2.30 -0.11 0.08 2.35 -0.05 0.35 5
home owner 0.45 0.40 -0.06 0.18 0.45 -0.01 0.89 8
program: business admin 0.72 0.71 -0.01 0.82 0.72 -0.00 0.90 2
program: economics 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.28 0.02 -0.01 0.36 2
program: communication 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.29 0.07 0.01 0.70 2
program: business IT 0.15 0.13 -0.02 0.41 0.14 -0.01 0.70 2
number of observations 298 277 293
Note: ‘mean’, ‘dif’, and ‘pval’ reports the respective means, mean differences and p-values of the mean
differences. ‘missing’ provides the number of missing observations in the respective variable.
In what follows, we have divided the variables of our dataset into the following categories:
control variables W , mediators X, outcomes Y (the expected gross wage category directly
after the studies or 3 years later), and G for gender.
To investigate whether randomization was successful, Table 3 reports the means of the
control variables W separately for the control group, for questionnaires with the information
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treatment, and for those with a reversed order of personal and professional questions. Mean
differences between the means of the respective treatment group and control group as well
as p-values of mean difference tests are also provided. Balance appears to be decent (albeit
not perfect), as only 3 differences are significant at the 10% level and only 1 is at the 1%
level.
Table 4: Intervention effects
treatment: information treatment: order
female male female male
est se pval est se pval est se pval est se pval
outcome: gross wage category after studying
mean differences -0.19 0.33 0.57 0.23 0.27 0.38 0.26 0.28 0.37 -0.09 0.27 0.74
OLS with controls -0.26 0.33 0.43 0.27 0.29 0.36 0.22 0.28 0.42 -0.18 0.28 0.53
double lasso -0.36 0.33 0.28 0.23 0.30 0.44 0.18 0.28 0.53 -0.14 0.28 0.63
mean among controls 5.97 7.11 5.97 7.11
outcome: gross wage category 3 yrs after studying
mean differences 0.14 0.33 0.68 0.62 0.32 0.05 0.14 0.32 0.66 -0.21 0.31 0.51
OLS with controls -0.01 0.35 0.97 0.61 0.34 0.08 0.05 0.32 0.86 -0.18 0.32 0.58
double lasso -0.07 0.34 0.84 0.60 0.34 0.07 0.05 0.31 0.88 -0.19 0.32 0.54
mean among controls 8.47 9.91 8.47 9.91
Note: ‘est’, ‘se’, and ‘pval’ reports the ATE estimates, heteroscedasticity robust standard errors, and p-
values for the mean difference estimator (‘mean differences’), OLS controlling for W (‘OLS with controls’),
and doubly robust estimation based on separate lasso estimations of the propensity score and the conditional
mean outcome (‘double lasso’). The mean value of the outcome in the control group (‘mean among controls’)
is also reported.
Table 4 reports the results of the treatments on either outcome separately for females
and males. The first row (‘mean differences’) presents the experimental estimate based
on mean differences in outcomes between the respective treatment group and the control
observations.5 The second row (‘OLS with controls’) provides the estimated when linearly
conditioning on W based on OLS to control for any imbalances in the potential confounders.6
The third row (‘double lasso’)presents the results when using (double) lasso-based estimation
of the treatment propensity score Pr(G = 1|W ) and of the outcome E(Y |G,W ) to estimate
the treatment effect by semiparametric doubly robust estimation, see Belloni, Chernozhukov,
Fernandez-Val, and Hansen (2017). We to this end use the ‘rlassoATE’ command with its
default options of the ‘hdm’ package by Chernozhukov, Hansen, and Spindler (2016) for the
statistical software ‘R’. This method controls for elements in W in a data-driven way under
5Wage expectations after studying and three years later are not reported for 10 and 9 observations,
respectively, that are dropped from the analysis.
638 observations with either missings in W or Y are dropped from the analysis.
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the assumption of approximate sparsity, i.e. that relatively few variables suffice for tackling
most of treatment-outcome confounding.
Concerning the information treatment, it is worth noting that the gender wage gap
of the displayed age categories 20-29 and 30-39 is roughly in line with the average
expectational wage gap in the group with the control version of the experiment (see ‘mean
among controls’ for males vs. females). However, the expected average wage levels in the
control groups are considerably lower than in the graph of the information treatment.
The effect estimates (‘est’) suggest that the information treatment increased males’ wage
expectations three years after studying by roughly 0.6 categories (or 300 CHF). These
estimates are marginally statistically significant at the 10% level across the three methods
considered, see the heteroscedasticity robust standard errors (‘se’) and p-values (‘pval’).
The information treatment therefore appears to increase the expectational wage gap
between males and females. Furthermore, it exacerbates over-confidence among males, as
early career wages among university graduates are actually lower than expected by both
males and females (even without information treatment), see Table 2. In contrast, the
information treatment did neither statistically significantly affect males’ wage expectations
directly after studying (albeit point estimates are again positive) nor female expectations
in either period. Secondly, reversing the order of the professional and personal questions
did not show any significant impact on wage expectations.
Finally, we address our second question, namely whether or not the inclusion of a broad
set of controls, focusing not only on professional preferences but also on personal ones,
suffices to account for the direct, unexplained effect of gender on wage expectations.
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for control variables W , mediators X, and outcomes
Y , separately by gender G. The first 4 columns provide the means of (non-missing values
of) the respective variables by gender, mean differences across gender, and the p-values of
differences-in-means tests for the original sample. We observe that females and males differ
importantly in a range of characteristics like the choice of study program, age, targeted
industry and occupation, as well as job expectations and job views.
The last 2 columns of Table 5 provide mean differences across gender and p-values after
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Table 5: Descriptives and balance tests for covariates and mediators
Original sample After re-weighting
mean females mean males difference p-value difference p-value
Control variables W
age 22.84 23.44 0.60 0.00 -0.01 0.92
Swiss 0.88 0.88 -0.00 0.92 -0.01 0.62
has siblings 0.92 0.92 -0.00 0.85 -0.03 0.14
mom has higher education 0.23 0.20 -0.03 0.31 0.00 0.93
dad has higher education 0.42 0.37 -0.05 0.13 -0.00 0.98
mum worked full time when I was 4-6 0.21 0.11 -0.09 0.00 0.01 0.57
mum worked part time when I was 4-6 0.44 0.43 -0.01 0.71 -0.00 0.93
wellbeing 2.35 2.36 0.01 0.80 0.04 0.39
home owner 0.44 0.43 -0.01 0.83 -0.04 0.11
treatment: information 0.31 0.33 0.01 0.67 0.02 0.41
treatment: order 0.37 0.31 -0.06 0.07 -0.00 0.91
Mediators X (first part): study program, professional plans, intended industry and occupation
program: business admin 0.71 0.72 0.02 0.58 -0.01 0.70
program: economics 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.97
program: communication 0.13 0.03 -0.11 0.00 0.02 0.40
program: business IT 0.07 0.19 0.13 0.00 -0.00 0.93
future plans: work full time 0.64 0.61 -0.04 0.25 0.05 0.09
future plans: education 0.44 0.44 -0.00 0.96 -0.03 0.39
industry: construction 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.10 -0.03 0.09
industry: trade and sales 0.40 0.50 0.11 0.40 0.07 0.22
industry: transport and warehousing 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.23 -0.01 0.66
industry: hospitality and restaurants 0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.31
industry: information and communication 0.38 0.31 -0.08 0.02 0.03 0.36
industry: finance and insurance 0.28 0.44 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.35
industry: consulting 0.12 0.16 0.03 0.14 -0.02 0.44
industry: education and science 0.12 0.08 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.62
industry:health and social care 0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.17 -0.01 0.71
occupation: general/strategic management 0.25 0.37 0.12 0.00 -0.01 0.71
occupation: marketing 0.35 0.27 -0.08 0.01 -0.04 0.23
occupation: controlling 0.10 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.89
occupation: finance 0.20 0.29 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.59
occupation: sales 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.31
occupation: technical/engineering 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.14
occupation: human resources 0.22 0.08 -0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00
position: manager 0.29 0.45 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.50
Mediators X (second part): job expectations/views, preferences and plans concerning work and family life
expect: well paid 3.91 3.90 -0.01 0.84 -0.04 0.43
expect: invest in employees 4.37 4.16 -0.20 0.00 -0.01 0.89
expect: good relations with boss 4.54 4.25 -0.29 0.00 0.10 0.08
expect: job security 4.05 3.73 -0.32 0.00 0.04 0.51
expect: family friendly 3.60 2.81 -0.78 0.00 0.03 0.69
expect: interesting tasks 3.98 3.80 -0.18 0.01 0.04 0.50
expect: identification with work 3.78 3.54 -0.24 0.00 0.06 0.32
expect: priorities are flexible 3.62 3.50 -0.12 0.06 -0.05 0.43
views: fast decision making 2.94 3.04 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.80
views: competitive atmosphere 2.87 3.20 0.33 0.00 -0.06 0.31
views: self responsibility 3.56 3.77 0.21 0.01 0.02 0.81
views:hierarchical structure 2.70 2.94 0.24 0.00 -0.06 0.43
stable partnership in 5-10 years 0.79 0.71 -0.08 0.01 0.02 0.58
preference for family 0.22 0.32 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.64
preference for career 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.92
wants children (0=no, 1=maybe, 2=yes) 1.67 1.70 0.03 0.49 -0.04 0.47
Outcomes Y
gross wage category after studying 6.01 7.16 1.15 0.00
gross wage category 3 yrs after studying 8.57 10.04 1.48 0.00
Note: Trimming is 0.02 for the balancing tests after re-weighting, such that observations with propensity scores smaller than
0.02 or larger than 0.98 are dropped.
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reweighting treated observations by the inverse of the probit estimate of the propensity score
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) and non-treated observations by the inverse of the estimate of 1−Pr(G =
1|X,W ).7 Such reweighting allows assessing whether the propensity score utilized in our
IPW procedure (see Table 7 below) successfully balances differences in W and X across
gender as required for evaluating the explained and unexplained components. This indeed
appears to be the case when dropping observations with extreme propensity scores below
0.02 or above 0.98 (such that trimming is equal to 0.02 as in Table 7), as most p-values
are beyond statistical levels of significance. Only 3 differences in elements of W or X are
statistically significant at the 10% level, while no difference is significant at the 5% level.
Figure 2 in the appendix displays the propensity score distributions separately for females
and males and demonstrates that they decently overlap.
Table 6 provides the results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition when considering two
sets of mediators. In the first approach (‘subset of mediators’), we only include those X
variables that are related to characteristics typically observed and considered in decompo-
sitions, namely the study program, job or educational plans after finishing the BA studies,
as well as the intended industry, occupation, and job position. In our second approach, we
in addition include variables that are typically not observed in data sets used for decompo-
sitions, but available in our questionnaire (‘all mediators’): job expectations and views, as
well as preferences and plans concerning work and family life. We report the indirect and
direct effects (or explained and unexplained components) when considering either females
(‘indir.f’, ‘dir.f’), or - as it is common in wage decompositions - males (‘indir.m’, ‘dir.m’) as
reference group (G = 1). In either case, the direct and indirect effects sum up to the total
gap in wage expectations, defined as the mean difference between males and females (‘total
m-f’). The results are presented for two outcomes, namely the expected gross wage category
after finishing the studies and 3 years later. Besides the point estimates (‘est’), standard
errors (‘se’) and p-values (‘pval’) based on 499 bootstrap replications are reported.
The expectational wage gap between males and females amounts to more than one
category (=500 CHF) for wages after studying and to more than 1.4 categories 3 years
later. The wage gap is driven by both observed characteristics X and unexplained factors.
765 are dropped due to missing values in W , X, or G.
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Table 6: Oaxaca Blinder decomposition
subset of mediators all mediators
total m-f indir.f dir.f indir.m dir.m total m-f indir.f dir.f indir.m dir.m
outcome: gross wage category after studying
est 1.12 0.43 0.69 0.58 0.55 1.07 0.49 0.58 0.69 0.38
se 0.16 0.15 0.22 0.16 0.22 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.23
pval 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.10
missings 45 72
outcome: gross wage category 3 yrs after studying
est 1.44 0.55 0.89 0.68 0.76 1.41 0.50 0.91 0.78 0.63
se 0.18 0.16 0.23 0.16 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.21 0.26
pval 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02
missings 45 72
Note: ‘total m-f’provides the total expectational wage gap between males and females. , ‘indir.f’ and ‘dir.f’
give the indirect (or explained) and direct (or unexplained) components when females are the reference
group. ‘indir.m’ and ‘dir.m’ give the respective components when males are the reference group. Point
estimates (‘est’) as well as standard errors (‘se’) and p-values (‘pval’) based on 499 bootstrap replications
are reported. ‘missings’ provides the numbers of dropped observations due to missingness in variables.
Furthermore, when the set of variables in X is extended from the subset to all mediators,
the magnitude of the indirect effect (or explained component) increases and that of the
direct effect (unexplained component) decreases. However, for either outcome, reference
group, and definition of mediators, any direct and indirect effects are highly statistically
significant, suggesting that even our atypically rich set of mediators cannot fully explain the
expectational gender wage gap.
Table 7: Decomposition with trimming equal to 0.02
M1 M1+M2
total m-f indir.f dir.f indir.m dir.m total m-f indir.f dir.f indir.m dir.m
outcome: gross wage category after studying
est 1.06 0.37 0.69 0.56 0.50 0.94 0.45 0.49 0.65 0.29
se 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.17 0.22 0.18 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.34
pval 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.39
missings / trimmed 45 / 3 72 / 25
outcome: gross wage category 3 yrs after studying
est 1.37 0.50 0.87 0.67 0.71 1.29 0.48 0.81 0.81 0.48
se 0.17 0.19 0.25 0.16 0.21 0.19 0.31 0.34 0.25 0.28
pval 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.09
missings / trimmed 45 / 4 72 / 20
Note: ‘total m-f’provides the total expectational wage gap between males and females. , ‘indir.f’ and ‘dir.f’
give the indirect (or explained) and direct (or unexplained) components when females are the reference
group. ‘indir.m’ and ‘dir.m’ give the respective components when males are the reference group. Point
estimates (‘est’) as well as standard errors (‘se’) and p-values (‘pval’) based on 499 bootstrap replications
are reported. ‘missings’ and ‘trimmed’ provide the numbers of dropped observations due to missingness in
variables and extreme propensity scores, respectively.
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Table 7 reports the results for IPW, which allows controlling for potential confounders
W and relaxing linearity assumptions. We to this end use the ‘medweight’ command of
the ‘causalweight’ package by Bodory and Huber (2018) for the statistical software ‘R’,
with trimming set to 0.02 and 499 bootstrap replications for the estimation of the standard
errors. Even though the precision of estimation is somewhat lower than before, the results
are qualitatively similar to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. By and large, both the direct
and indirect effects remain important for explaining the expectational wage gap. Using a
larger trimming threshold of 0.04 results in quite stable results (see Table 8 in the appendix).
24
6 Conclusion
Using novel survey data from students from the Business School of the Bern University of
Applied Science (BUAS) and the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the Univer-
sity of Fribourg, this paper quantifies the role of career and family preferences on gender
differences in wage expectations in Switzerland. After having documented the presence of
gender differences in wage expectations, this paper provides three main results: First, gen-
der differences in wage expectations account for more than 1 salary class (CHF500) right
after studying, and for more than 1.4 salary classes 3 years later. Both males and females
overestimate actual wages from comparable graduates. Second, results from an information
intervention (about median wages earned in Switzerland) suggest that only males (incor-
rectly) revise their expected wages three years after studying upward, by about 0.6 of a
salary class (CHF300). This results in a larger expectational gender wage gap, by poten-
tially exacerbating over-confidence. Third, the expectational wage gap is explained by both
observed and unobserved factors. Using mediation analysis (which permits explicating en-
dogeneity issues), we find that the expectational gender wage gap cannot be fully explained
even after considering a very rich set of mediators, inclusive of career choices, family prefer-
ences and family plans. Results are stable under different specifications, including trimming
thresholds and the randomization of the survey questionnaires.
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A Appendix
A.1 Tables and figures
Figure 2: Common support for estimated Pr(G = 1|W,X)
Table 8: Decomposition with trimming equal to 0.04
M1 M1+M2
total m-f indir.f dir.f indir.m dir.m total m-f indir.f dir.f indir.m dir.m
outcome: gross wage category after studying
est 1.05 0.37 0.68 0.55 0.50 0.90 0.35 0.55 0.64 0.26
se 0.17 0.17 0.24 0.16 0.22 0.19 0.23 0.29 0.25 0.29
p-value 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.36
missings / trimmed 45 / 10 72 / 61
outcome: gross wage category 3 yrs after studying
est 1.36 0.49 0.86 0.66 0.70 1.18 0.48 0.71 0.72 0.46
se 0.21 0.18 0.27 0.17 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.33 0.24 0.28
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.10
missings / trimmed 45 / 8 72 / 64
Note: ‘total m-f’provides the total expectational wage gap between males and females. , ‘indir.f’ and ‘dir.f’
give the indirect (or explained) and direct (or unexplained) components when females are the reference
group. ‘indir.m’ and ‘dir.m’ give the respective components when males are the reference group. Point
estimates (‘est’) as well as standard errors (‘se’) and p-values (‘pval’) based on 499 bootstrap replications
are reported. ‘missings’ and ‘trimmed’ provide the numbers of dropped observations due to missingness in
variables and extreme propensity scores, respectively.
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A.2 Questionnaire
32
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear students 
 
  The answers to the following questions are to be used for research.  There is no identifier that could 
trace the questions to any particular individual, so your answers will remain strictly confidential.   
 
    The survey is fully voluntary.  If you choose to answer it, know that I do appreciate your taking the 
time. 
 
      Thank you and best regards, 
                Ana Fernandes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      v_p
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A1 General questions about yourself 
 
A1.1 
 
How old are you?  ______ 
 
A1.2 
 
Your gender is:          □ Female            □ Male        
 
 
A1.3 
 
What is your nationality (indicate the country you feel closer to, if multiple are possible)?     
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
A1.4 
Which degree programme are you taking at the Bern University of Applied Sciences? 
 
□ Bachelor of                                      I □ Master of                                I  □                                            
 
A1.5 
Which study model have you chosen? 
 
□ Full-time degree programme I □ Part-time degree programme  I  □                                                       
A2 Questions about your professional path 
 
 
 
 
A2.1 
Which statement best describes you at the moment? 
 
□ You already have work experience (full-time or part-time) 
 
□ You have held odd jobs to supplement income or not worked at all 
 
□ Other __________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
A2.2 
What are your plans regarding work or study once you complete the degree you are currently enrolled 
in?  Multiple answers possible: 
 
□ Work full-time    □ Work part-time    □ Further education (MA, or another advanced degree, or...) 
 
□ Do not intend to seek employment    □ Other _________________________________________ 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A2.3 
Consider the following company and job attributes.  Please assign a grade from 1 to 5 to each one, with 
5 being highly valued and 1 being not important. 
 
__  Company pays well   
 
__  Company invests in people and in their careers 
 
__  Flexible working conditions with respect to schedule and location 
 
__  Pleasant relations with boss and colleagues 
 
__  Job security 
 
__ Supportive policies to accommodate maternity/paternity 
 
__  Daily tasks are intellectually stimulating 
 
__ Your work in the company contributes to a cause that is important to you  
 
__  Flexibility in setting priorities and tasks 
 
__  The commuting time between your home and the office is short 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A2.4 
Consider the following company and job attributes.  Please assign a grade from 1 to 5 to each one, with 
5 being very good and 1 being very bad. 
 
__  Long hours 
 
__  Repetitive 
 
 __ Need to systematically make decisions in a very short time        
 
__  Mistakes would impact negatively the well-being of many people 
 
__ The environment is very competitive 
 
__ Personal accountability for successes and mistakes 
 
__ Hierarchical firm structure 
 
 
 
 
A2.5 
What are your expected monthly gross earnings (no taxes deducted) when you graduate from the 
current studies (in Swiss Francs)? 
 
 □ Below 3’500    □ 3’500-4’000      □  4’000-4’500      □  4’500-5’000      □ 5’000-5’500      □  5’500-6’000  
   
□  6’000-6’500     □ 6’500-7’000      □  7’000-7’500      □  7’500-8’000      □ 8’000-8’500     □  8’500-9’000  
 
 □ 9’000- 9’500    □ 9’500-10’000    □ 10’000-10’500   □ 10’500-11’000   □  More than 11’000   
 
 
 
 
A2.6 
What are your expected monthly gross earnings (no taxes deducted) 3 years after graduation (in Swiss 
Francs)?                                  
 
□ Below 3’500    □ 3’500-4’000      □  4’000-4’500      □  4’500-5’000      □ 5’000-5’500      □  5’500-6’000  
   
□  6’000-6’500     □ 6’500-7’000      □  7’000-7’500      □  7’500-8’000      □ 8’000-8’500     □  8’500-9’000  
 
 □ 9’000- 9’500    □ 9’500-10’000    □ 10’000-10’500   □ 10’500-11’000   □  More than 11’000   
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A2.7 
 
Set your salary at graduation at 100.  How much do you think will be earned by a student with the same 
characteristics as yours but of the other gender? 
                                                                             Salary at 
 
                                                                            Graduation    
 
If possible, please say why___________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
A2.8 
 
Set your salary 10 years after graduation at 100.  How much do you think will be earned by a student 
with the same characteristics as yours but of the other gender? 
                                                                              Salary at 
 
                                                                                                  Graduation    
 
If possible, please say why ___________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A2.9 
In which industry do you expect to be working upon completion of your degree? 
 
□  Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining     □ Manufacturing       □ Construction      □ Trade and Sales 
 
□ Transportation and storage    □ Accommodation and food service   □ Information and communication 
 
□ Finance and insurance           □ Real estate          □ Consulting       □ Public Administration   
 
□ Education and Science          □ Health care and social care   □ Arts, entertainment and recreation 
 
□ Other ______________________________________            □ Don’t know 
 
 
 
 
A2.10 
In which occupation do you expect to be working upon completion of your degree? 
 
 □ General and strategic management       □ Marketing               □ Controlling            □ Finance 
 □ Research and Development                   □ Sales                     □ Logistics                □ Production   
 □ Technical support and engineering        □ HR                          □ Unskilled occupation     
 □ Other _______________________________________         □ Don’t know   
 
 
 
 
 
A2.11 
 
In your future professional career, which role would you prefer to have: 
 
□ A management/leadership position in a company (for example CEO)? 
 
□ A specialist/supporting position (for example the head of a cabinet providing specialized support to the 
CEO)? 
 
□ Not sure yet 
 
□ If you chose one of the first two options above, please explain why you prefer one over the other 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
A3 Questions about family and other personal dimensions 
 
A3.1 
In the next 5 to 10 years, do you see yourself in a stable partner relationship? 
 
□  Yes        □  No         □  Not sure 
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A3.2 
 
Would you like to have children eventually?  If your answer is “yes,” please indicate how many. 
 
□  No        □  Yes       □ Not sure     (If yes) How many?    _____  
 
 
A3.3 
If you were in a stable partner relationship with children in the next 5 to 10 years, which employment 
type would you prefer: 
 
□ Work full-time      □ Work part-time       □ Not work        □ Other ___________________________ 
 
 
 
A3.4 
 
If you were in a stable partner relationship with children in the next 5 to 10 years, which employment 
type would you prefer your partner to have: 
 
□ Work full-time    □ Work part-time     □ Not work    □ The employment status preferred by the partner      
 
□ Other__________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A3.5 
 
When you were a young child of pre-Kindergarten age (roughly ages 0-4), what was the employment 
status of your parents in general? 
 
□  My mother did not work                                       □  My father did not work 
 
□  My mother worked part-time                                □  My father worked part-time 
 
□  My mother worked full-time                                  □  My father worked full-time 
 
□  Other: ______________                                      □  Other: ______________ 
 
_____________________________                        ______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A3.6 
 
When you were a young child of Kindergarten age (roughly ages from 4-6), what was the employment 
status of your parents in general? 
 
□  My mother did not work                                       □  My father did not work 
 
□  My mother worked part-time                                □  My father worked part-time 
 
□  My mother worked full-time                                  □  My father worked full-time 
 
□  Other: ______________                                      □  Other: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A3.7 
 
During your first school years (1st to 6th grade), what was the employment status of your parents in 
general? 
 
□  My mother did not work                                        □  My father did not work 
 
□  My mother worked part-time                                 □  My father worked part-time 
 
□  My mother worked full-time                                  □  My father worked full-time 
 
□  Other: ______________                                      □  Other: ______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
A3.8 
 
Which sentence describes you best? 
 
□   Family life is important to me 
 
□  Family life is important to me but so is my professional career 
 
□  I value my professional career more than I value my family life     
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A3.9 
 
Please tell us about your family members by indicating the number of relatives that you have of each 
type below. 
 
Siblings ___                                  Living parents or step parents ___                Living grandparents____ 
 
Partner/girlfriend/boyfriend____                 Own children____          
 
 
 
A3.10 
 
Please answer this question if you have siblings.  How many of your siblings are older than you? 
 
  I have ___ sisters who are older than me.           I have ___ brothers who are older than me. 
 
 
 
A3.11 
 
How many people do you share your place of residence with? ________ 
 
If you do not live alone, please specify who you are living with (parents, siblings, ...)  
 
_______________________________________________________________________________       
 
 
A3.12 
 
What type of residence do you live in? 
 
□ Rented flat           □ Rented house       □ Own flat       □ Own house       □ Other _________________     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A3.13 
 
What is the highest educational attainment of your parents: 
                                                                                                         Mother               Father 
 
Compulsory schooling (up to lower secondary schooling) or less         □                         □ 
 
Apprenticeship or vocational degree                                                     □                         □ 
 
Upper secondary schooling (including high school)                              □                         □ 
 
University (Bachelor degree)                                                                 □                         □ 
 
University (Masters degree)                                                                  □                         □ 
 
University (PhD/doctorate)                                                                    □                         □ 
 
Another (please specify)                                                                       □                         □ 
 
                                                                                               _____________       ______________  
 
 
 
 
 
A3.14 
 
How would you evaluate your material well-being compared to the average person in Switzerland?  
I am doing: 
 
Much worse              Worse                      Roughly the same              Better                       Much better 
than average       than average                    as average                  than average               than average 
person                      person                            person                         person                          person 
 
    □                                □                                    □                                     □                                  □    
 
 
